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NOW THAT THE COURTS HAVE BEATEN
CONGRESS TO THE PUNCH, WHY IS
CONGRESS STILL PUNCHING THE
PATENT SYSTEM?
Robert A. Armitage* †
Introduction
The U.S. House of Representatives began September by passing the Patent Reform Act of 2007. This bill, if enacted, would make major changes to
U.S. patent law. Given the universally recognized need for improvements to
the U.S. patent system, passing a patent reform bill in the House should
have been easy. It was not. The Patent Reform Act of 2007 made it through
the House only after a spirited debate. There were a host of complaints by
House members that the bill was not ready for floor action. In the end, it
passed the House by a relatively narrow margin, 220 members voting for the
bill and 175 members voting against.
What made for such tough congressional sledding?
I. Dueling Agendas for Patent Reform
The bill is controversial because it mostly reflects the wish list of a single-minded coalition of interests. The bill’s supporters allege that the
enforcement of many U.S. patents is no less than lawsuit abuse. The core
supporters of the House bill responded to these allegations with provisions
to limit the damages available to patent owners, to restrict the judicial venues available for patent enforcement actions, and to provide additional nonjudicial forums for deciding patent validity. In other words, the House saw
the case for patent reform as largely one for tried and true tort reform. Understandably, many patent owners do not see the House action as a reform of
the patent system at all, but rather as a concerted effort to diminish it.
The contrary views of what is and is not needed patent reform come
from a diverse set of constituencies. Those opposed to the path taken in the
House bill range from bar associations (the Intellectual Property Law Section of the American Bar Association and the American Intellectual Property
Law Association) to trade associations (the National Association of Manufacturers and the Biotechnology Industry Association). Those leading the
*

Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Eli Lilly and Company, Indianapolis, IN.

†
Suggested citation: Robert A. Armitage, Commentary, Now That the Courts Have Beaten
Congress to the Punch, Why Is Congress Still Punching the Patent System?, 106 Mich. L. Rev.
First Impressions 43 (2007), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol106/armitage.
pdf.

43

44

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

[Vol. 106:43

opposition to the House bill are among the strongest supporters of an alternative set of patent reform measures—the April 2004 recommendations of
the National Academy of Sciences.
The National Academy, after an intensive, four-year study of the U.S.
patent system, recommended patent reforms that would remove highly subjective elements from the U.S. patent law–and the expense, unpredictability,
and uncertainty that those elements inject into the patent system. Other National Academy reform recommendations would permit a patent’s validity to
be readily determined from publicly accessible information–again eliminating more of the expense, unpredictability and uncertainty that uniquely
plague U.S. patent law. By any reckoning, the National Academy recommendations—although they would substantially rework fundamental aspects
of the operation of U.S. patent law—struck a careful balance between the
interests of those seeking to enforce valid patents and those seeking to challenge questionable ones.
Supporters of the National Academy recommendations accepted the
Academy’s core findings. The Academy found that the effectiveness of the
U.S. patent system is impaired in large measure because quirks of our domestic patent system make it uniquely costly and complicated to use; it also
found that it is time to jettison antiquated patent law principles that are in
use here but nowhere else in the world. These supporters, thus, see comprehensive patent reforms as having the potential to greatly improve the quality
of issued patents and the ease of assessing a patent’s validity. The reforms
may also ensure that enforcing a patent in court could never be credibly
termed an act of lawsuit abuse.
The House bill, however, simply bypassed the National Academy’s recommendations for a more transparent and objective U.S. patent law. The
House punted on the core recommendation of the National Academy to
place U.S. patent law principles in greater harmony with concepts present in
every other country around the world. It postponed implementation of the
most important of these harmonizing measures: introduction of the firstinventor-to-file principle. In the fine print in the transition provisions of the
bill, the implementation of this principle was put off to the distant date when
European countries have ratified a new version of the European Patent Convention containing a so-called “grace period”!
The National Academy’s recommendation to remove all of the highly
subjective factors from U.S. patent law was also left unrealized. The House
declined to take steps needed to limit the most important of these subjective
elements, the defense to the enforceability of a patent based upon allegations of so-called “inequitable conduct.” This defense in recent years has
denied patent owners the right to enforce otherwise valid and infringed patents because of little more than “technical fouls” committed during patent
procurement. The bad conduct that can trigger loss of enforceability can be
nothing more than a misstatement or incomplete statement made to the
United States Patent and Trademark Office in a patent application, even if
this conduct made no difference to the decision to grant the patent.
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As the bill reached the floor, the House approved an amendment that essentially rejected the National Academy’s recommendation to eliminate the
“inequitable conduct” defense. The current bill codifies a broad reach for the
“inequitable conduct” doctrine—one that would render the U.S. patent statute unique in the world in affording a defense of this type to infringers of
valid patents.
On the “inequitable conduct” issue alone, the House bill sets a precedent
that could have dire international consequences for U.S. interests. Should
other countries incorporate a similar provision into their patent laws, this
could subject foreign patents of U.S. inventors to all manner of new unenforceability assertions. This is an especially troublesome prospect for U.S.
interests in countries that stand to benefit more by inexpensively copying
U.S. technology than by respecting and protecting U.S.-origin intellectual
property rights.
II. “Trolls” Versus “Anti-Trolls”: The Lawsuit Abuse
Agenda Examined
What led the U.S. House of Representatives to ignore broadly supported
calls for needed reforms to U.S. patent law that were laid out by the National Academy in a set of compelling, well-reasoned recommendations?
Are the aforementioned “lawsuit abuse” allegations so persuasive that they
justify Congress enacting legislation that many believe represents a devastating retreat from decades of consistent U.S. support for strong and
effective patent laws—and may have highly undesirable consequences for
U.S. innovators seeking to profit from their innovations in markets outside
the United States?
One answer is that supporters of the House-passed bill have thus far
successfully advanced the case that something must be done about “trolls”
who own patents and the patent plaintiffs’ bar willing to take trolls’ cases
into court. Trolls are patent owners whose business is based at least in part
on acquiring patents from others to generate licensing income or, failing
that, to collect damages based upon infringement of the acquired patents.
Even though trolls may merely be exercising a right to compensation for
infringement of valid patents, an anti-troll constituency argues that the troll
business model is viable in part because patent litigation unfairly disadvantages accused patent infringers and unfairly advantages patent owners.
These disadvantages arise in large measure, so they assert, because the federal courts’ patent jurisprudence excessively rewards inventors and makes it
too difficult to invalidate questionable patents.
Starting soon after the Federal Circuit was created in 1982, a number of
specific contentions have provided grist for these anti-troll gripes. For example, looking back to the 1980s and 1990s, anti-patent forces asserted that
juries had too much leeway in deciding what a patent covers. Every patent
includes one or more “claims” that must lay out with definiteness and particularity what subject matter is legally protectable and what is not. When
deciding what a patent covers, anti-patent forces contended that juries were
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too easily swayed in their determination of what a patent claim means and
they routinely gave patent owners the benefit of the doubt.
The anti-patent constituency throughout the 1990s also asserted that inventors could too easily expand the reach of patents to include all manner of
“equivalents” to what the patent actually discloses and claims as the invention. Patent owners, these anti-patent forces contended, could readily and
unfairly extend the reach of their patents beyond anything the patent laid out
as the true invention because the courts sanctioned a far too liberal application of the “doctrine of equivalents.”
By the start of the current decade, anti-troll forces were focused on optimizing their leverage against patent owners in order to force them to settle
patent infringement claims on favorable terms. They began the cry that patent owners had undue leverage in such settlement discussions on account of
the threat of injunctions that could shut down an accused infringer’s business. According to anti-trolls, the injunctive threat existed even in cases
where the equities favor the accused infringer and counsel for denying the
patent owner this extraordinary relief. The courts, they asserted, simply
failed to undertake the type of equitable inquiry that should balance, among
other equitable factors, the hardships between property owners and infringers.
Additionally, anti-trolls have long argued that patents are far too easy to
get. The United States Patent and Trademark Office does not–under the antitroll view of the world–adequately prevent the patenting of obvious discoveries. Anti-trolls have stated that courts also sustain too many patents that
provide no more than trivial advances in technology. Anti-trolls believe that
the “non-obviousness” requirement put into the patent statute in 1952 effectively has been read out of the statute (or at least marginalized) by the
arbitrary judicial requirements that patents must be sustained unless there is
a specific teaching, suggestion, or motivation that would have inevitably led
skilled persons to the invention.
Another unfair leverage point for patent owners that has appeared in the
anti-trolls’ litany is the alleged ease of pursuing punitive damage claims by
asserting that the infringement of the patent was willful. Anti-trolls have
argued that the “duty of due care” imposed by the courts on accused infringers has placed enormous obligations on them to avoid being tarred as
willful. Anti-trolls have asserted that in many situations this can require the
infringer to obtain an exculpatory opinion from patent counsel before commencing any allegedly infringing activity.
The anti-trolls additionally complain that compensatory damages in
many patent cases are often vastly more than merely compensatory. Under
the anti-troll worldview, compensatory damages have been based upon the
entire value of an infringing product even if the value attributable to the invention relates only to a single aspect or component of the product. This
means, again under the anti-troll worldview, that infringers have been forced
to pay grossly excessive damages. The threat of runaway damages, the antitrolls believe, has forced extravagant settlements of patent lawsuits (Research in Motion, over $612 million in 2006 to settle BlackBerry
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infringement claims) and has produced huge jury awards (Microsoft, $1.5
billion verdict in 2007 on MP3-related patents incorporated into its Windows OS).
III. The Courts Have Beaten Congress to the Punch in
Addressing the Anti-Trolls’ Anti-Patent Agenda
While the foregoing indictment of the work of the courts in patent cases
could hardly be more pervasive, do these allegations justify the House bill’s
reworking the patent statute to the benefit of the anti-trolls? The answer to
this question is, of course, a resounding “no.” The courts have done—or are
ably doing—everything that needs to be done to address the foregoing allegations of a runaway, pro-troll U.S. patent law.
What has happened over the past decade with respect to allegedly unfair
treatment of patent infringers? Quite simply, the two courts with the greatest
influence on the interpretation of U.S. patent law, the Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court—with help from clear-thinking district court judges—have
squarely addressed and redressed each allegation of tilting towards trolls.
More remarkably, the courts have done so promptly and decisively. The federal courts, when presented with a cogent allegation of an unfair pro-troll
tilt, have found appropriate judicial vehicles to redress the concern. The record of the past decade speaks for itself.
In the 1996 case Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., the Supreme
Court affirmed an opinion of the Federal Circuit that the construction of
claims in a patent case is not an issue that can go to the jury, but rather is
reserved for the judges before whom the patent case is heard. This brought a
categorical end to any concern that juries might be favoring patent owners
and incorrectly crediting patent owners’ errant contentions about the full
reach of the patent’s claims.
The Supreme Court’s 2002 opinion in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co. laid down stringent rules for the application of the
“doctrine of equivalents” in patent cases. In the years since Festo, the concern that patent owners could benefit from an elastic reading of their claims
that routinely extended to cover alleged “equivalents” has disappeared in its
entirety.
In 2006, in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, the Supreme Court took on
the contention that the threat of injunctive relief was driving unreasonable
and unwarranted settlements in patent cases. It reiterated that injunctions
could issue only when equity required that such extraordinary relief be
granted, casting aside the supposed Federal Circuit’s rule in patent cases
that, absent exceptional circumstances, injunctions should issue once infringement of a valid patent has been established.
In April 2007, the Supreme Court bolstered the standards for application
of the non-obviousness requirement in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.
The Court cast aside any mechanical application of a much-maligned
“teaching-suggestion-motivation” threshold test for assessing nonobviousness. It then provided an analytical framework for non-obviousness
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determinations designed to assure that patents will not be sustained on trivial differences from existing technology. Thus, when a patent is found valid
today, an infringer can quibble little with the conclusion that it misappropriated a truly non-obvious discovery of the inventor.
In an August 2007 decision in In re Seagate Technology, LLC, the en
banc Federal Circuit removed the specter that the threat of punitive damages
could force accused infringers into unfair settlements of patent infringement
allegations. It eliminated the longstanding “duty of due care” to avoid the
knowing infringement of valid patents. Rejecting any inquiry into the subjective beliefs of the infringer, the court sharply limited any future findings
of willful infringement (and enhanced damages based thereon) absent clear
and convincing evidence that the infringer’s actions were objectively unreasonable.
Finally, and most significantly, the baseless nature of the concern that
trolls somehow take home unwarranted damages in patent cases is best exemplified by Judge Rudi M. Brewster’s decisive action in Lucent
Technologies Inc. v. Gateway Inc., a case in the Southern District of California. Following a May 2007 jury verdict in favor of the patent owner Lucent,
Judge Brewster initially ordered the infringers to pay $1.53 billion in damages for infringement of two patents. However, merely three months later,
Judge Brewster vacated the verdict after finding the jury lacked sufficient
evidence to award damages based upon the entire market value of the infringing product. The anti-troll constituency pressed its case in Congress for
amendments to the patent statute restricting compensatory damages—even
though Judge Brewster was able to apply existing law, without any congressional intervention, to address oversized damages through a routine posttrial motion.
This remarkable string of judicial decisions over the past decade leads to
an inescapable conclusion: time after time, the alleged abuses or excesses
cited by the anti-trolls have not required a congressional fix. The consistent,
winning formula for the anti-trolls has been to take a meritorious case into
court and win on the merits—under the existing patent statute.
IV. The Easy Choice Is the Right Choice for Congress
What are the issues that the 110th Congress should tackle if its objective
is true reform of U.S. patent law? Given the long history of judicial responsiveness on each of the above “lawsuit abuse” allegations, Congress should
have an easy choice.
On one hand, Congress could kowtow to the anti-troll constituency that
incorrectly sees today’s patent law as being tilted to favor owners of patents.
It could attempt to rewrite patent law to favor infringers, notwithstanding
what the courts have done magnificently over the past decade to fairly and
decisively address allegations of overreaching by patent owners and lax application of existing standards for patenting.
Alternatively, Congress can do what the National Academy of Sciences
and many other important constituencies have recommended—advance
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much needed reforms that will produce greater harmony and objectivity in
the patent law. Specifically, Congress could enact broadly supported measures that would provide patent owners and patent challengers alike the
benefits of the best ideas from the best patent systems in operation around
the world.
Conclusion
Since U.S. global competitiveness depends on international respect for
IP rights of U.S.-based inventors, Congress should be given every encouragement to make the right choice, especially given that the right choice
would appear to be such an easy one.

